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ABSTRACT
Network management is one of the key technologies
needed to fulfill the requirements. In other words, a new
paradigm for network management is also needed, in
order to address the requirements arising both from the
ATN side and the telecommunication side of the new
telecommunication infrastructure. In particular, the new
network management paradigm will incorporate the ATN
management framework consisting of related standards,
along with the telecommunication management
framework, notably Telecommunication Management
Network (TMN) standards from ITU-T.
INTRODUCTION
Civil aviation is characterized by constraints of different
nature-impacting airlines, airport operators, and other actors
intervening on the platform. We briefly isolated and
illustrated these constraints by organizing them into two
categories: regulatory constraints and operating constraints.
The regulatory constraints refer to security and passengers
economical rights. Security imposes certain obligations such
as the respect of the security area integrity, reliability of the
boarding pass, separation between screened passengers, and
non-screened passengers and reconciliation, before take-off,
between the passenger and his property. In addition,
passengers have some economical rights that are concerning
fulfillment of their contract of carriage.
Air traffic management is a broadly defined function
which includes airspace management (ASM), Air Traffic
Control (ATC), and Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM).
Its objective is to enable aircraft operators to meet their
planned schedules of arrival and departure and adhere to
preferred flight profiles.
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Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is an important
service, it aims to ensure an optimum flow of air traffic to or
through airspaces during times when demand exceeds, or is
expected to exceed, available capacity of the Air Traffic
Control (ATC) system. The term ATFM is used to embrace
any activity concerned with the organization and handling of
the flow of air traffic in such a way that, while ensuring the
safe, orderly, and expeditious flight of individual aircraft, the
totality of the traffic handled at any given point, or in any
area, is compatible with the capacity of the ATC system. The
term ATC capacity reflects the ability of the ATC system or
any of its subsystems or operating positions to provide
service to aircraft during normal activities, and is expressed
in numbers of aircraft entering a specified portion of the
airspace in a given period of time. The maximum peak
capacity which may be achieved for short periods may be
appreciably higher than the sustainable capacity. ATFM
supports ATC in meeting its main objectives of preventing
collisions between aircraft, expediting and maintaining an
orderly flow of air traffic, as well as of achieving the most
efficient utilization of available airport and airspace capacity.
Before starting the development process of the public air
transport control and diagnostic system, passengers and
maintenance personnel needs were analysed. Some of these
needs were:
*modularity and flexibility of different software
and hardware solutions,
*reducing causes of vandalism acts,
*introduce "black box" functionality into the
control system,
*integrated passenger on-board and depot
information system,
*system compatibility with other public transport,
and
*rapid timetable deviation and expert
model-based fault analyses.
IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE, JUNE 2009 333
Authorized licensed use limited to: Technical University of Ostrava. Downloaded on September 18, 2009 at 07:09 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
LIý oge ""c ______ Gatiway
Access~;Acas
Fig. 1. The virtual server ATN management support
NETWORK MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEW
NETWORK SERVICE PARADIGM
Encounters between the two paradigms have been one of
the driving forces behind several important technical
developments in late 1 990s, voice-over IP, and Next
Generation Network (NGN), to name a few. The same is true
for network management, whose aim is to achieve high
reliability and accountability of network operations and
services through the use of Network Management System
(NMS). In the early stages of the ATN, there was fairly clear
separation between the ATN and telecommunication, both in
terms of technologies and management responsibilities. The
majority of traffic was still voice and the telecommunication
network provided a WAN infrastructure, upon which the
ATN was built as an overlay.
With the growth of the ATN, the volume of data traffic
surpassed that of voice traffic and it has become common to
build an all ATN-based backbone network, which is overlaid
directly on SONET or Wavelength Division Multiplexing
(WDM). These two networking paradigms - ATN and the
telecommunication network - will merge into a new
telecommunication infrastructure.
The future telecommunication service environment will
look like a virtual network server, which consists of a set of
application-specific servers running on ATN-based application
protocols interconnected by a high-speed all optical network.
The virtual server provides access to actual servers and
service/network management support; see Figure 1.
In this new paradigm, network/service management itself
is a service, provided by a set of specialized servers. Though
it resembles the ATN, this new telecommunication must
provide good characteristics as found in today's
telecommunication network, i.e., high reliability and
universal availability.
Network management is one of the key technologies
needed to fulfill the requirements. In other words, a new
paradigm for network management is also needed, in order to
address the requirements arising both from the ATN side and
the telecommunication side of the new telecommunication
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infrastructure. In particular, the new network management
paradigm will incorporate the ATN management framework
consisting of related standards, along with the
telecommunication management framework, notably
Telecommunication Management Network (TMN) standards
from ITU-T.
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The active policy augments the network intelligence of
network Operation Support System (OSS) by adding more
intelligent behavior at the service management layer.
Safety Enhancements
Providing internet access to airplanes when they are
airborne opens up many possible service opportunities. Some
are related to flight security and some are commercial in
nature. Below is a list of possible service features that can be
deployed in an internet-enabled airplane:
using the internet access gateway as a beacon
device -
when an airplane is airborne, it is very important
for the administration to keep track of the
position of the airplane. Typically, air traffic
control keeps track of the flight position using
transponders that detect a radio signal from the
air route traffic control center or terminal radar
control centers and respond with an amplified
signal specifying crucial flight data including
flight speed and height information. Although
this system works efficiently, it is possible to
turn off the transponder with the existing
implementation. In fact, the pilot activates the
transponder once the flight is airborne. This
poses serious security threats as a hijacker,
knowing the mechanism, can turn off the
transponder and break communication between
the ground station and the airborne flight,
*download of flight critical data in real-time -
the black box plays an important role in
retrieving important data from a crashed
airplane. A black box constitutes two parts:
- cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and
- flight data recorder (FDR).
As the name suggests, the CVR unit records the voice
activity inside the cockpit and the FDR records the trivial
data (like flight speed, altitude, temperature, etc.) related to
the flight. Most of the black boxes used in today's airplanes
are either made of magnetic tapes or solid-state memory
boards. The magnetic tape based black boxes are being
phased out and most of the solid-state memory board-based
black boxes. With the existing computer hardware
technology, it is possible to use a high capacity storage
device within the airplane. This storage device can be
connected to a server and also to the traditional black
box/sensor network. One of the main advantages of using a
server with the storage device attached is that the server can
mirror all flight data to the ground station in real-time. This
helps the ground station monitor the flight status/health and
assist the flight crew in disaster situations,
*real-time video surveillance -
flight safety is one of the most widely discussed
topics in the aviation industry. With the existing
video compression standards, it is possible to
transmit the video signals to the ground station
in real-time. This enables the ground station to
monitor the in-flight activities during abnormal
situations and make appropriate decisions. This
also helps the ground crew be prepared in the
case of medical emergencies,
*remote controlling -
in remote situations where the flight crew is
compromised or is unable to control the flight
due to some unforeseen reasons, the ground
station could enable remote controlling of the
flight so that the flight could be landed safety on
the ground. This feature will be helpful in the
event of hijacks or medical emergencies.
AVIATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Along with safety, the avionics subsystem must also
possess sufficient security provisioning for a successful
deployment. Adoption of open standards for data networks
has further increased the security concemns. In addition, care
must be taken about security requirements while achieving
interoperability between various systems within the airplane.
In any network system, there are three basic security
requirements that need to be addressed. They are
confidentiality, authentication, and integrity. Data
confidentiality ensures the privacy of end-users and protects
their data from spoofing. Similarly, data integrity ensures that
the data sent by the end-user is not modified by any
malicious element in the network. Authentication is one of
the most important factors in network security as it controls
access to the network resources. Authentication ensures that
only valid users have access to the network resources.
In addition to the above requirements, an airplane network
needs additional security in termns of separation between
various network segments. The control network has to be
protected from unauthorized access. This requires the control
network to be separated from the passenger network. Also, the
passenger network resource usage needs to be monitored and
controlled, which requires the passenger network to be
connected to a gateway that performs both monitoring and
controlling functions, in addition to providing Internet access.
Security Issues
The security issues involved with airplane networks can be
broadly classified into two categories:
* external, and
* internal.
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The external security issues are mostly related to the
external link connecting the airplane network with the ground
station and to the protocol used to provide mobility support.
The airplane network could be connected to the ground
station by either satellite links or wireless links, depending on
the location of the airplane. While the airplane is airborne, it
could use either a satellite link or terrestrial link to connect to
the ground station. If the airplane is within the range of a
wireless access point, it could even use wireless media to
connect to the external world. Each of these media has
security issues associated with it.
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Fig. 4. Public air transport on-board control
and diagnostics system
AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM DESIGN
The main requirements of the avionics subsystems are
high determinism and low response time. Different layer 2
technologies like Ethernet, ATM, and fibre channel could be
considered to provide such a high determinism and low
response time. Ethernet is one of the strongest contenders for
connections between various flight subsystems and is also
mentioned in standards.
Avionics Data Network Design
Security and quality of service are the two important
parameters that need to be considered while designing the
aviation data networks. The quality of service here does not
reflect the quality of service requirements of the end-user
applications, but it represents the requirements of the
avionics subsystem itself.
One of the major security requirements of aviation data
networks is the separation of different network subsystems.
An aviation data network could possibly contain three major
network segments; namely, a control network, crew network,
and passenger network. As the names suggest, the control
network predominantly consists of avionics components.
The crew network is used by the flight crew for
monitoring purposes and the passenger network enables
internet connectivity for the passengers.
R54Baud PC
In order to protect the control network from unauthorized
access and security attacks, it is necessary that the control
network is separated from rest of the aviation data networks.
The separation can either be logical or physical. The
network activity monitoring/controlling server could be built
in line with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
However, unlike normal IDS, the network activity
monitoring/controlling server can make decisions based on
the data feed from many sources including the cabin voice
recorder and surveillance equipment placed at strategic
locations within the flight. The server could potentially
control all of the active forwarding devices. Depending upon
the network activity and the security status of the aviation
data network, the server can reconfigure the active devices
and facilitate control network traffic during emergency
situations.
SYSTEM ATN
The control and diagnostic system is divided into the
on-board; see Figure 4. Messages that are transmitted
between an airplane and the dispatching centre have different
priority levels. High priority messages should be transmitted
immediately, while others can be transmitted periodically or
when a connection is possible.
The Diagnostic System has a Hierarchical Structure
Different diagnostic methods and functions are integrated
into the system, depending on the priority and system
hierarchy level. Functionality of the diagnostic system is
distributed between several devices. The traffic supervision
and maintenance expert system is used in the diagnostic,
control, dispatching, economic, and maintenance process. For
example, some functions of the on-board diagnostic system
are:
" built-in self/tests of the complete airplane,
" event recording, and
" fault detection, presentation, corrective actions,
interlocking.
The functions of the maintenance expert system in the
dispatching center are:
* support for preventive, corrective, and
conditional maintenance,
" analysis of event recorder data and fault
database,
* remote diagnostic/fault elimdination via wireless
data link,
" knowledge-based systems for trouble-shooting,
etc.
36 IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE, JUNE 200936
Authorized licensed use limited to: Technical University of Ostrava. Downloaded on September 18, 2009 at 07:09 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
GSM0WU~m* MA
-w~ Amm Pok
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Behavioural. Analysis of the Tower Controller Activity
The observation was based on the camera recordings and
the audio of the controller; there were no recordings of the
pilots' communication available. The camera was placed
slightly aside of the controller, out of his line of sight.
The recording involves two controllers working at the
tower control position. The first controller was filmed from
the beginning of his shift up to the hand off (50 minutes),
whereas the following controller was filmed only at the
beginning of his shift (remained 10 minutes).
The amount of collected data for both controllers was not
equal; therefore we did not carry out a comparison between
the performances of both controllers.
The observation exclusively concerned the behavioural
activity of the controller. The following activities were
distinguished to describe the controller's performance:
" Window:
when the controller was looking outside the
window in front of his position. As a
subcategory there is the usage of binoculars
marked, describing a period when the controller
is supporting vision with binoculars.
" Radar:
describes the time when the controller was
looking or manipulating with a radar or screen
providing meteorological information.
* Strips:
describe the time when the controller was
scanning, ordering, or writing on the strips.
" Strips delivery:
describe the time when the controller was out of
the working volume, allowing him to scan the
window in order to provide strips to other
positions.
" Coordination:
describes the activity when the controller
discussed and arranged traffic between the
Ground control, Supervisors, or Flight Data
Assistant.
Clearance:
describes issuing clearances. There were two
kinds of instructions remarked:
- Landing describes issuing instructions for
aircraft that are still airborne ("clear to land"
and "continue approach").
- Runway vacated describes issuing
instruction to aircraft that already landed
("contact ground").
" Non-active:
describes the time when a controller was not
occupied with control activity. Due to low level
of traffic, he was involved in other activities
(chatting with others, resting) while remaining
in his position.
" We used the Interact software to record
parameters of activities, produce graphic
representation of data, and obtain basic statistic
analysis.
For the analysis, the frequency of occurrences and
duration of activities were measured. Frequency is calculated
as a total number of occurrences and duration is the time of
the activity. One occurrence of a particular activity is defined
as continuous action without interruption. Any distraction
was treated as the suspension of action and started a new
occurrence. Thbe information provided by radar including the
screen with meteorological conditions for manipulating with
strips required head-down time, whereas looking outside is
head-up activity.
The controller regularly refocuses his vision between
direct observation at great distance and the radar image on
his desk.
The activity placed in a column will be followed by an
activity placed in a row with the given probability. The
highest probabilities are highlighted in red. The transition
probability indicates that the controller was constantly
switching his attention between the radar, window, and strips.
Additionally, we did not define any special pattern for
airborne and landed aircraft as seen from the two last rows of
the table.
Tracking Requirements for
ATC Tower AR Environments
The typical taxonomy for tracking is based on technology.
There are seven principal categories of tracking technologies.
An appropriate tracking system must meet the
requirements of an air traffic control tower. First, the
sensitive surveillance and communication equipment in the
tower does not allow sources of potentially disturbing
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exogenous signals. Second, the tower personnel must be free
to perform their activities unhindered by the tracking system.
For this reason the tracking system must have a natural
source and be non-intrusive.
A tracking system relies on a source emitting a signal
perceived by a sensor. An artificial source may be emitting a
magnetic field, rays of light, or sound waves. A natural
source, on the other hand, may be Earth's field of gravity or a
subject's muscles. A natural source tends to be permanent
and omnipresent and is therefore accepted in the tower.
An implementation of mechanical tracking would be a
so-called "boom," which is a cantilever-mounted display
tracking the user's field of view (FOV). Due to its large form
factor, this must be considered as too intrusive.
Body-mounted exoskeletons cannot convey orientation
unless all joints from the feet and up are implemented. In
addition to being inarguably intrusive, the tracking system
must be accompanied by extra sensors for orientation, a
set-up which is rather to be considered as a hybrid system. If
the intrusiveness criterion were relaxed to allow small
sensors on the body, inertial tracking could have been
considered, but inertial tracking exhibits drift, poor
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at low motion frequencies, and
can only provide relative positioning.
With operational events of air traffic, the process loses its
ability to ensure ATC requirements and traffic volumes can
exceed capacity levels. In such situations, en-route
controllers change their opening scheme configuration and
may require the CFMU to activate some constraints on some
specific flows. There is a trade-off between under-use of
system resources (i.e., keeping margin in occupancy rate) and
real-time constraint satisfaction (i.e., real air traffic
compatible with ATC needs).
Ad-hoc events
Air rfficCurrent
Operations
Fig. 7. Airline operation effect on ATFM
Previous description is depicted in Figure 6, now there are
two important remarks:
Air TafficCurrent
RegutionAir Traffi(
Fig. 6. Current implementation of ATFM
Air Traffic Flow Management Pre-Tactical Planning
Balancing in the European ATM system consists in
ground delay programs, aircraft may be affected by
regulation delay at departure airports in order to satisfy
capacity constraints of arrival airport and airspace sectors
throughout the trajectory. The Central Flow Management
Unit, located in Brussels, uses the flight plans already
submitted to measure magnitudes of traffic volumes in the
system then generates the required amounts of delay.
Flight plans are submitted at least three hours before the
estimated off-block time, when regulation starts at about two
hours before off-block time, the required delay is
continuously (i.e., periodically) updated according to the
global air traffic demands and the capacity limitations
activated by ATC.
Priority is given to the first aircraft planned to enter the
sector, as equity suggests.
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" Perturbations are not independent from the input
signal, and
" Regulation is made on the basis of flight plans
already submitted, under assumption that flights
are all on time (or have negligible delays).
The primary purpose of aircraft operations control is to
ensure the optimum operation of flights planned for a certain
defined period ahead of departure and until their completion,
and to coordinate with all concerned, and, finally, to
disseminate information about any measures taken in case of
irregularities. Within an airline organization, this centralized
function is carried out by the Airline Operations Center
(AOC) and its main objectives are: to keep the flight program
as close as possible to the published schedule; and minimize
the effects of any irregularities in accordance with company
policy. In so doing, the AOC will keep the various
operational departments concerned informed about the
movement of aircraft, e.g., flight operations, engineering
control, passenger, and airport.
Accurate and timely information concerning aircraft
departures and arrivals, and variations to the planned flight
programs, such as delays, diversion, cancellations, reroutings,
and change of aircraft type, will enable the operational
departments to coordinate their activities in the best interests
of airline customers, thereby enhancing flight safety,
punctuality and regularity, and reducing costs.
To control effectively a large fleet of aircraft for a
worldwide operation is a very complex undertaking. Today,
computerized systems process and organize the immense
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amount of data involved and provide the Airline Operations
Centers with a better knowledge of the total situation and the
libely consequences involved. As a result, this improves the
operational decision-making process which, in turn, can
contribute significantly to efficiency and profitability of
airline operations.
Fig. 8. Proposed design for ATFM
As depicted in Figure 7, dispatchers in airline operation
centers use aircraft which may be delayed because of some
ad-hoc event, in order to recover the nominal schedule of
services or reduce the costs of irregularities. This dynamic
change in demand, depending on the real state of air traffic is
not considered in the current ATFM implementation, so it's a
supplementary perturbation to regulation output. Notice that
ad-hoc events in Figure 7 can be supposed to be independent
of the system input.
Better regulation can be achieved by pre-filtering air
traffic demand. The pre-filter has the duty to anticipate
short-time change in flight times from the current state of air
traffic, which allows getting reliable information about sector
loads during the stage of regulation.
Uncertainty is inherent in Air Traffic Management, if it's
impossible to foresee an aircraft failure or to prevent bad
meteorological conditions, delays spoiling the series of
flights because of propagation and airline operational control
policies can be estimated by modelling the behavior of
dispatchers. The role of the pre-filter is to compensate the
disruptions resulting from 0CC tactical actions.
Because of the complexity of this task, we restrict the
scope to the phenomenon of delay propagation throughout
the daily schedule of an aircraft, as follows.
By analogy with updating flight strips once aircraft are
airborne, which have been adequately fulfilled, it's plausible
to extend the range of update beyond next ground operations
if we get the necessary pieces of information. It is not quite
as accurate as current strip update, because taxi time is
somewhat variable and the ground block span may contain a
margin used as an absorber in regard to delay. But even so,
confidence intervals can be provided as prediction inference.
Pre-filtering needs to have knowledge of the allocation
between aircraft and flights, flights A and B of Figure 9
relate to the same plane. It's a pity that flight plans mention
call signs with aircraft types but no information about aircraft
tail numbers. Since that's how it is, airlines are able to
substitute for aircraft of the same type in order to minimize
the costs of delays without filing new flight plans,
imperiously three hours before the estimated off-block times.
A peaceful way to undertake this problem consists in trying
to match the flights accomplished by the same aircraft on the
basis of flight plans data.
For the purpose of clarity, we are going to provide a real
example of pre-filtering based on coupling departure with
arrival flights. However the general inference process
remains beyond the scope of this paper, as mentioned before,
because of the diversity of phenomena, airlines
characteristics, and behaviors. This matter is still under
investigation.
Flight A
Landing In block
Flight B
Off block Take off
.- I
lux am
Fig. 9. Aircraft lifecycle
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Security and crisis management issues are of paramount
importance for the success of human events. Citizen's
confidence level, as far as the ability of organizers to provide
security is concerned, is a factor directly impacting their
presence. Considering the success of air transport events
depends, to a great extent, on the security level provided,
automated systems for crisis prevention and management are
expected to have wide application. Air transport-related
crimes, however, require sophisticated plans. Managing crisis
situations during large scale air transport events means to
adopt an integrated system which incorporates intelligent
access control and spectator tracking systems.
Modem biometric technologies provide enhanced security
levels by introducing a new dimension in the authentication
process called "proof by property." However, the design and
deployment of a security architecture incorporating biometric
technologies hides many pitfalls, which when underestimated
can lead to major security weaknesses. Although biomnetrics
have been deployed in pilot systems for protecting access to
air transport events in the past, no integrated solution has
been proposed taking into account the related security
standards and no complete studies have ever proven the
benefits of such deployments.
Intelligent Access Control System
The basic component of the system is the biometric access
control system for the access control of spectators and
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accredited persons. This system minimizes security risks and
offers the possibility to intelligently control the throughput
rate, the stadium completeness, monitor the movement of
spectators and accredited persons within the stadium
premises, and remotely control the gates. The strength of the
system is centered on the indubitable biometric identification
method (fingerprint scanning), complemented by the ease of
use offered by the RFID technology and the portability
resulting from the use of already available mobile
communications infrastructures (GSM, GPRS, or WiFi). The
smart card is used not only to secure access to physical
resources, but also to store data about the cardholder as well
as a limited set of critical medical information (Emergency
Data Set) or provide the key to access information stored in a
remote database. The RFID smart card is also deployed for
monitoring the statistical movement of the spectators
between specific zones, for tracking patterns that may be
translated to crisis signs (e.g., mass movement between
specific areas) and submit the appropriate alerts to the
Coordination Centre.
CONCLUSION
Policy-based management is likely to serve as a key
integration technology for end-to-end ATN management and
also for telecommunication network. Activity policy is a
relatively new research area, which is to be explored in the
coming years.
The new system gives the following advantages:
" many functions can be integrated into the
multi-processor system for optimum
cost-effectiveness,
" modular design allows flexible addition of
components with minimum expense for extra
hardware or software,
" redundancy can be incorporated simply and
inexpensively, and
" high reliability.
Data network-enabled aircrafts have opened up a new set
of service opportunities. At the same time, they have also
introduced several security threats that need to be addressed.
These security threats can originate from outside the airplane
or from within the plane. Policy-based management is likely
to serve as a key integration technology for end-to-end ATN
management and also for telecommunication networks.
Activity policy is a relatively new research area, which is to
be explored in the coming years.
Biometrics security system enabled air transport have
opened up a new set of service opportunities. At the same
time, they have also introduced several security threats that
need to be addressed. These security threats can originate
from outside the airplane or from within the plane.
The chosen method of measurement is as follows:
Narrowband measurements (within one 8.33 kHz channel)
from base band LF audio to base band LF audio will be
pursued. Pre-computed measurement signals (maximum
length sequence, chirp,) will be transmitted half-duplex in
both directions (uplink and downlink) and recorded on the
receiver side. The measurements will be post-synchronized
through parallel recording of the transmitted and received
signal and a highly accurate 1 PPS (one pulse per second)
GPS synchronization signal.
Even though this approach will not deliver results as
accurate as wideband channel sounding could, it is the
method of choice. Wideband channel sounding would
otherwise require a set-up that is large and complex, that is
very expensive, and that occupies a frequency bandwidth
which is virtually unfeasible in the VHF band.
Data network enabled aircrafts have opened up a new set
of service opportunities. At the same time, they have also
introduced several security threats that need to be outside the
airplane or from within the plane.
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